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Time Concepts, Philosophy and Foundations of Physics 
Abstract. According to approach which author of this article applies, judgment of time concept 
represents a kind of conscious activity that help to visualizes time passing and time duration 
within collective imagination produced by scientific mind. The appeal to an image of the 
Universal Clock allow the rethinking modernistic views and finding some ways to elimination 
of the disunity of foundations. The main methods, which author of this article uses, are 
speculative analysis and modeling. The author disagrees with Kantian interpretation of 
subjectivity, which is presented in Basterra (2015). He offers the contra-argument with respect 
to the interpretation of transcendental philosophy, which is made in Nenon (2008). The author 
claims that (i) cultural and historical development of the scientific knowledge determines the 
evolution of the philosophy of physics, and (ii) an evolution of epistemology is triggered by 
transcendental limits of the comprehension, which is presented in collective imagination as its 
structures. The limit of the comprehension in collective imagination at Modern period 
implicates ‘Nature– Human’ attitude. As a result, the author discusses foundations of the 
modern philosophy of physics and their transformations via development of the images of time. 
The author proves five main theses. (1) The Universal Clock, which is understood as a symbol, 
discloses in philosophy of physics a way to comprehension of general foundations. (2) The 
association of the science and human being demonstrates the perspectives to constitution of the 
philosophy of physics, which is based on some features of human nature, its dependence from 
temporariness. (3) The modernistic meaning of time provides the opportunity to find the 
general basics of the scientific knowledge. (4) Contemporary philosophy of physics depends on 
the phenomenological concept of an intuitive environing world by Husserl, which presupposes 
the subjective character of time concepts. (5) The symbolization of the Universal Clock 
discloses the essence of the relationship between philosophical speculations and the studies in 
the natural science. 
Keywords: history and philosophy of physics; foundations of physics; Einstein; 
philosophical interpretations of General Relativity; time as a symbol.  
  
Introduction 
The significance of time concept traditionally relates to measurement of processes duration that 
provides calculation concerning velocity of bodies’ moving and/or degree of objects’ changing. 
This significance presupposes universal scale like the Universal Clock for measurement of 
velocity and changings. The difficulty of exact calculation in each frame of references logically 
follows from a relativity theory, namely, the difficulty to mark whether a certain object moves 
or does not move. It leads to the absence of Universal Clock, which can measure velocity and 
degree of changes in general. There is a clock variety. Such a situation complicates the 
measurements, because the equivalence of measurement standards is born. In foundations of 
physics, similar situation develops, and it relates to serious epistemological consequences. 
There is an equivalence of any kind of acceptable knowledge standards and disunity of 
foundations, which can be revealed by analogy with an exhibit of clock variety. In modern 
studies, are presented at least three branches of mentioned disunity of foundation: 
a) group of authors who merely describes the disunity (Popper 1982; Bernstein 1983; 
Laudan 1990);  
b) group of authors who supposes that disunity is necessary (Jhingran 2001; Fine 2007; 
Sankey 2012);  
c) Cliff Hooker (2011) who tries to find a middle way as follows: 
…provides a naturalist, yet non-instrumental, theory of rationality that is rich and 
powerful enough to illuminate the complex cognitive dynamics of scientific 
development and the interacting development of rational capacity itself. It provides 
a proper basis for understanding the intra-twined process of improving rationality 
while developing solutions to problems, a process central to solving problems in a 
new domain where the nature of the problem and what procedures to use to solve 
it, are themselves ill-defined and in need of resolving as much as is the problem 
solution. And the account is grounded in the interactivist-constructivist foundations 
of bio-cognitive organization. Consequently, its content, while not formally 
 specified, is determined by this explanatory scope (Hooker 2011, 172). 
According to approach which author applies, judgment of time concept represents a kind of 
conscious activity that help to visualizes time passing and time duration within collective 
imagination produced by scientific mind. The appeal to an image of the Universal Clock allow 
the rethinking modernistic views and finding some ways to elimination of the disunity of 
foundations. The author disagrees with Kantian interpretation of subjectivity, which is 
presented in Basterra (2015). He offers the contra-argument with respect to the interpretation of 
transcendental philosophy, which is made in Nenon (2008). The author of this article claims 
that (i) cultural and historical development of the scientific knowledge determines the evolution 
of the philosophy of physics, and (ii) an evolution of epistemology is triggered by 
transcendental limits of the comprehension, which is presented in collective imagination as its 
structures. The limit of the comprehension in collective imagination at Modern period 
implicates ‘Nature– Human’ attitude.  
This article includes five main sections. Sec. 1 shows topical character of time concept as the 
problem of the Universal Clock and its consequences in modern philosophy of science. Sec. 2 
shows the connection of time and human being, which is logically flowed from the 
philosophical way to make a judgment of time concept. Sec. 3 and sec. 4 present the 
significance time in the period of formation of contemporary philosophy of physics. Sec. 5 
demonstrates the author’s criticism of the Universal Clock and disunity of foundations in 
contemporary philosophy of physics. 
Method  
In this article, the author applies the ideas and methods, which analytical philosophy elaborates, 
namely, (i) the idea that mind and language demonstrate connections, and (ii) dependence on 
mind activities on the basic assumptions of logics. The main methods are speculative analysis 
and modeling. The author’s key idea can be formulated as follows: 
An analysis of relations between scientific knowledge and the nature of time 
visualizes the foundations of contemporary philosophy of physics 
The body of research show the way to entering and discussion of the problem of time in a view 
 of five connected theses: 
T.1 The Universal Clock, which is understood as a symbol, discloses in philosophy of 
physics a way to comprehension of general foundations. 
T.2 The association of the science and human being demonstrates the perspectives to 
constitution of the philosophy of physics, which is based on some features of human 
nature, its dependence from temporariness. 
T. 3 The modernistic meaning of time provides the opportunity to find the general 
basics of the scientific knowledge.  
T.4 Contemporary philosophy of physics depends on the phenomenological concept of 
an intuitive environing world by Husserl, which presupposes the subjective character 
of time concepts.  
T.5 The symbolization of the Universal Clock discloses the essence of the relationship 
between philosophical speculations and the studies in the natural science. 
From the philosophical point of view, the hierarchy of the mentioned-above theses constitute 
the model of creation in scientific mind, evaluation and resolving the topics concerning the 
judgment of time. 
Universal Clock as a Symbol in Philosophy of Physics 
The author believes that connections between scientific knowledge, the nature of time, and 
foundations of contemporary philosophy of physics presupposes a special meaning of a problem 
of time, which could be seen in a view of finding the Universal Clock. This interpretation helps 
to see an essence of relationship between philosophical speculations and studies in natural 
science. In this section, the author gives the pro-argument with respect to the following Thesis: 
T.1 The Universal Clock, which is understood as a symbol, discloses in philosophy of 
physics a way to comprehension of general foundations. 
The proof reasons with respect to the Thesis (1) are as follows: 
I. The image of the Universal Clock provides a connection between philosophy and 
natural science by the analogy with computational knowledge. The computational 
knowledge demonstrates the signs of exact science, which is based on 
 mathematical modeling. Nevertheless, this knowledge shows the character of a 
pure ideal essence that does not exist. All one sees are only the lines of a program 
code on the screen of the computer display. In the same way, the clock that uses for 
time measurement demonstrates the signs of real device, and the signs of fictional 
object as well.  
II. The lack of Universal Clock or the other similar basic symbol leads to the 
following consequences. Modern physics demonstrates competing theories with a 
status of valid knowledge regarding their own presuppositions such as the Theory 
of General Relativity (Einstein 1916) and the Relativistic Theory of Gravitation 
(Logunov, Loskutov and Mestvirishvili 1987). There is no universal standard to 
solve what theory is true. Many problems characterize the difference of physics and 
any other disciplines, namely, difference of cognitive standards in physics and 
standards in chemistry, biology, or some kinds of humanitarian knowledge. 
Mathematics is applied in theoretical physics, but it is very little useful into the 
historical studies and even in biology, except genetics. In noted kinds of 
knowledge, a comprehension of objectivity demonstrates their radical difference. 
However, every historian or, perhaps, each psychologist would disagree that results 
of their branch of knowledge has a less objectivity than it is in any natural science. 
In real science, an absence of universal foundations determines a lack of universal 
foundations in philosophy of physics. 
III. This article demonstrates a neediness of universal foundations in philosophy of 
physics as follows. Contemporary philosophy of science deals with special region 
of reality concerning a problem of concept and nature of knowledge by a side of 
principles for getting of valid knowledge. Such principles, for instance, the 
principle of the Conceptual Unity must organize a holistic system of notions. The 
space is one of the basic notions for geometry and geography. In geography, space 
means a location of natural objects; thus, probably, Mazúr and Urbánek are right 
 when they define a space as emptiness. They mention: 
Because geography has not clearly defined “geographical or landscape 
space”, geographical spatial thinking seems to oscillate between two poles. 
One of these is represented by the concept of absolute space, the other one 
by the concept of relative space. The concept of geographical space is 
shaped under the influence of both these poles (Mazúr and Jakal Urbánek 
1983, 139).  
In geometry, space corresponds with a coordination of dots, which constitutes sets, 
imagined as different types of manifolds (Carnap 1974/1995, 125-143). There is 
no, thus, universal construction of a scientific notions system concerning time. It 
provides the following circumstances: 
IV. Lack of universal construction of a scientific notions system leads to an important 
epistemological problem. Topical character of a problem entails entrance of 
philosophy into humanitarian knowledge, while the holistic system of notions must 
also include the essentials of natural science. In epistemology and philosophy of 
science, a possible unity of subject domain which neither deduced nor synthesized 
may help to solve noted problem. An exhibit of a such subject domain is likely 
special opposition of research culture, namely, the limit of its ‘conscious 
consciousness’ (Kulikov 2015) or the structures of collective imagination as an 
attitude ‘Cosmos–Human’ at Antiquity or ‘God–Human’ at Medieval period. Basic 
structure of collective imagination at Modernity dimensions to the contrasting of 
nature and human, and the philosophy of science constitutes self- contained branch 
of knowledge, which plays special role within theoretical philosophy. Philosophy of 
physics thereby provides a possibility of understanding of valid processes, 
nonetheless its own foundation includes an important theoretical contradiction. Karl 
Popper (1982) notes that criteria of “coherent and clear picture of the Universe” are 
common task of natural sciences and philosophy. Solution of this task coincides with 
the essential complication within contemporary building the notions for regional 
 pictures of reality. The statements about reality include essential distortions. Joseph 
Schear (2007) shows the distortion in the place of necessary consequence of such 
presuppositions. 
Time and Human Being 
This section presents the pro-arguments with respect to the following Thesis: 
T. 2 The association of the science and human being demonstrates the perspectives to 
constitution of the philosophy of physics, which is based on some features of human 
nature, its dependence from temporariness. 
The proof reasons with respect to Thesis (2) are as follows: 
I. In the philosophy of physics, some outcomes of general ontology can help to 
construct a system of scientific notions. Martin Heidegger maintains as follows: 
Science in general can define as the totality of fundamental coherent true 
propositions. This definition is not complete, not does it get the meaning of 
science. As ways in which human beings behave, sciences have this being 
(the human beings) kind of being. ... To demonstrate that and how 
temporality constitutes the being of Da-sein, we showed that historicity, as 
the constitution of being of existence, is “basically” temporality (Heidegger 
1927/1996, 9-10, 371). 
The philosophers reveal a key role in understanding of human nature for notion of 
language and time. In general, Ludwig Wittgenstein opens special status of the 
language (Wittgenstein 1922). Martin Heidegger discloses constitutive meaning of 
the time within human being (Heidegger 1927/1996). Philosophy of physics must 
realize special meaning of language and time in the field of research activities. The 
time is a base of cultural and historical processes, subsequently, humanities apply that 
notion; but the time is a base for distinguishing of a location and a structure of natural 
processes as well; for instance, it is a motion of celestial bodies. As a result, there are 
two different notions to signify one phenomenon, namely the time of human and the 
time of nature. Rudolf Carnap (1938) shows that language as a system of signs, in 
 theory, might unite natural science and humanities, wherefore logic as a science was 
an artificial language, laid in a base of scientific investigations. Such project does not 
guarantee essentially scientific character of uniform language; for instance, it is very 
probable that not logic of reason, but logic of myth lies in the base of modern 
scientific activity (Barthes 1957/1991, 68-70). In theoretical philosophy, human 
nature plays a key role within understanding of the philosophy of physics, and the 
conceptualization of time and language helps to determine the profile of such 
position. 
II. In philosophy of physics, foundations relate to the problematic attitude ‘Nature–
Human’ as a structure of modern collective imagination and its essentials in general. 
Nowadays structure of collective imagination intensifies a split in scientific 
knowledge, which is realized as the fruits of human activity at separate regions of 
human reality. Two fundamental problems, namely a problem of Language and a 
problem of Time disclose. Their representation in a view of special structure of 
scientific mind helps to find the forms of the unity in foundations of epistemology. 
In turn, it requires a revision of the foundation in philosophy of physics. Scientific 
community needs the returning to modernistic or even classical interpretations of 
cognition within science and philosophy to find the universal basis for their 
integration and interaction. 
Problem of Time and Opportunities to Find the General Basics of Scientific Knowledge 
This section presents the pro-arguments with respect to the following Thesis: 
T.3 The modernistic meaning of time provides the opportunity to find the general 
basics of the scientific knowledge. 
The prof reasons for Thesis (3) are as follows: 
I. Elucidation of time as a symbol during formation of contemporary philosophy of 
science visualizes basic regularities of its functioning in a view of successor of 
modernistic philosophy. One of most important figures is David Hume (1738/1888, 
68-82) who believes that scientific knowledge has a unity in foundations. The 
 reflection of time within imagination and mind activity in modernistic and 
contemporary philosophy of physics, at first, needs to exhibit how science can be 
interpreted as a unity of knowledge. Modernistic authors (Descartes 1637/2007; 
Locke 1689/1995; Kant 1786/1891; Hegel 1817/1970) are the representatives of 
different traditions, but they recognize in general an idea that scientific cognition 
has a uniform foundations and universal organization. These foundations can be 
empirical or reasonable, but they are the reflection of the basic regularities in 
learning mind. In philosophy of physics, i.e. in a special branch of scientific 
knowledge, there are some universal foundations, namely the statements about 
finiteness and infiniteness of a data mining or statements about possibility and 
impossibility of verification for all kinds of theoretical knowledge. 
II. The author of this article supposes a key role for constituting of modernistic approach 
is played by Immanuel Kant, and some present-day investigations partly approves 
this assumption. For instance, Michael McNulty (2015) mentions: 
Kant clearly highlights the importance of systematization for empirical 
lawfulness, yet he fails to identify transparently the source of the necessity 
of empirical laws (McNulty 2015, 1). 
Kant is one of the first philosophers who imagines natural philosophy and 
philosophy of physics in a view of separate subject domain. The author of this 
article cannot fully agree with Gabriela Basterra (2015) who mentions that ability of 
reason really depends on argument of subject, thus subjectivity became 
unconditional. It is true for antinomies of pure reason. In natural philosophy, the 
situation differs. As Kant (1786/1891) shows, the Reason must correlate with 
objects in the process of constituting of knowledge. As a result, Kant (1786/1891, 
137) discloses the independent area within epistemological issues as a radical 
question separately about the limits of human abilities in cognition (the sphere of 
pure cognitive reason) and a question about foundations of human activity (the 
sphere of pure practical reason). The first one is the basis of philosophy of physics. 
 Preparing the formation of such doctrine, the predecessors of Kantianism are 
discussing the genesis of scientific cognition. In general, David Hume (1738/1888) 
investigates the human nature, and he tries to answer a question about genesis of 
human cognition, just as Descartes (1637/2007) and Locke (1689/1995) do it in the 
field of metaphysical and empirical researches. Hume (1738/1888) analyzes the 
foundations of science subordinating epistemological study to moral interests. He 
mentions as follows: 
And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, 
so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid 
on experience and observation. ‘Tis no astonishing reflection to consider, 
that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should 
come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century (Hume 
1738/1888, XX). 
The author of this article can prove the thesis ‘Kant is one of the main founders of a 
philosophy of physics’ as follows: 
a) Using distinction of the ways of nature representation in formal 
signification and in material signification Kant makes the critique of cognition 
abilities of human and maintains the metaphysical foundations of natural 
sciences. Kant assumes: 
Every doctrine constituting a system, namely, a whole of cognition, 
is termed a science; and as its principles maybe either axioms of the 
empirical or rational connection of cognitions in a whole. ... That 
only can be called science (Wissenschaft) proper whose certainty is 
apodictic: cognition that merely contains empirical certainty is only 
improperly called science. A whole of cognition that is systematic 
is for this reason called science, and, when the connection of 
cognition in this system is a system of causes and effects, rational 
 science (Kant 1786/1891, 137-138). 
b) The Kantian meaning of the modernistic approach to the foundations of the 
philosophy of physics is contained as follows. Pure scientific knowledge exists 
as a holistic phenomenon. A purity of the science exhibits the universal unity. 
From the Kantian, scientific knowledge is a system of apodictic laws or has the 
opportunities for developing in such quality. According to Kant (1786/1891), 
the apodictic knowledge receives proceeding from a possible or a pure 
representation as per study of subject, which almost or not depends on empirical 
sphere. Such knowledge is caused by the requirement of a special form of the 
contemplation, which is based on the constructing the notions. An ideal 
representation of the science most fully corresponds to the mathematics and 
theoretical physics, though exhibiting the formal or transcendental truth within 
knowledge of pure philosophy, based on the pure notions, deals with the highest 
or formal nature, or with the principles of things and is possible without 
mathematics (Kant 1786/1891, 138-139). A cognitive process that is involved 
in the constructing the pure notions is a holistic system of the universal 
scientific foundations regarding the principles of the philosophy of physics. 
Since Kant (1786/1891), the researchers within the philosophy of physics must 
to look for and describe these principles, namely Objectivity and Conceptual 
Unity. This context reveals a time as a continuum, which covers the events, 
followed one after another. In general, such opinion presupposes “ancient 
duality ‘consciousness-being’” (Sartre 1943/1993, 625). In physics, time 
primarily understand as a basis of the account of the numbers in arithmetic and 
one of the measures of the change of a velocity (Whewell 1840/1847, 135-141). 
Poorly understanding the meaning of time modernistic philosophy 
predetermines the decrease of topical character of a problem of time that is not 
as important for humanities as became in contemporary philosophy of science. 
II.c)An image of the philosophy of science, as a special branch within theory of 
 the knowledge, constituted by Kant, has supported until the end of 19
th 
century. 
Richard Rorty (1979) mentioned: 
With Kant, the attempt to formulate a “theory of knowledge” 
advanced half of the way toward a conception of knowledge as 
fundamentally “knowing that” rather than “knowing of” - 
halfway toward a conception of knowing which was not modeled 
on perception (Rorty 1979, 147). 
Rorty supposes that Kant (1786/1891) continues the way that Descartes 
(1637/2007) has started. The author of this article believes that Kant finishes 
this way. In addition, Kant has the influence not only in the epistemological 
investigations. As Friedman and Nordmann (2006, 52, 68) show, some 
discoveries in physics cannot be making without Kant’s studies and Schelling’s 
investigations in the scope of natural philosophy. However, the situation 
changes at the beginning of 20
th 
century when existence of the modernistic 
ideas comes to the end. A new image of the theory of knowledge and thereby a 
new image of the philosophy of physics constitute as per reflection of natural 
investigations and because of the several metaphysical reflections. Karl Popper 
(1982) shows that quantum physics opens the spheres of natural phenomena 
that are not depending on classical laws such as Law of Identity. In a scope of 
quantum mechanics, theoretical description of results of experiments opens new 
epistemological perspectives. Jeffrey Barrett (1999) gives an interesting 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. The world, which is constituted by 
quantum physics, nevertheless contradicts to the sphere of the classical 
phenomena. The movement of the phenomena in a visible world subordinates 
to the classical laws. As a result, an essential disunity in the foundations of the 
philosophy of physics constitutes. Andrew Schumann (2012) shows that close 
problems are born even in kingdom of deductive knowledge, in formal logic, 
wherefore logicians accept nowadays a relative randomness of the axiomatic 
 theories and application of methods for logical analysis. 
 
Subjective character of time and Foundations of the Philosophy of Physics 
This section presents the pro-arguments with respect to the following Thesis: 
T.4 Contemporary philosophy of physics depends on the phenomenological concept of 
an intuitive environing world by Husserl, which presupposes the subjective character 
of time concepts. 
The proof reasons with respect to the Thesis (4) are as follows: 
I. The author of this article supposes an origin of contemporary understanding of the 
disunity as a metaphysical position within modern philosophy of physics coincides 
with some later Husserl’s (1935/1965) works. The later Husserl’s works are directed 
on criticism of a base of natural sciences, but they revise the earlier own 
epistemological Husserl’s (1900/2001) views. Similar positions by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1953/1968), for instance, a concept of language game, are widely 
adopted after the later works of Husserl. In Logical Investigations, Husserl supposes 
that reaching a reliability of the knowledge not depends on influence of world 
around. Pure logic can disclose the reliability of the knowledge. Logic makes a unity 
of foundations in scientific cognition. In The Crisis of European Man, Husserl 
suggests to include some irremovable aspects of world around into a notion of 
scientific rationality. Husserl (1935/1965) mentions as follows: 
Now, without anyone forming a hypothesis in this regard, the world of 
perceived nature changed into a mathematical world, the world of 
mathematical natural sciences. … Mathematical science of nature is a 
technical marvel for accomplishing inductions whose fruitfulness, 
probability, exactitude, and calculability could previously not even 
suspected. ... In so far as the intuitive environing world, purely subjective 
as it is, is forgotten in the scientific thematic, the working subject is also 
 forgotten, and the scientist is not studied (Husserl 1935/1965, 183). 
In The Crisis of European Man, Husserl (1935/1965) sincerely believes that so- 
called spiritual diseases that provide the wars and mutual non-understanding 
among the nations presupposes a reminding of a value of intuitive environing 
world within science in the light of looking for correct methods of cognition. 
Modern science and modern philosophy cannot solve this problem, because 
science and philosophy substitute artificial structures the real world such as 
mathematical equations or one-sided understanding of human mind. A possibility 
of split opens as a transcendental characteristic of scientific cognition. An essential 
disunity of foundations nevertheless is an effect of representation of knowledge as 
its spontaneity but not necessity of intuitive environing world, which every 
scientist can produce in the limits of consciousness. Because of that, the author of 
this article cannot fully agree with Thomas Nenon (2008) who supposes that 
Husserl’s transcendentalism and Kant’s concept of transcendental philosophy 
shows a fundamental difference between them. Nenon mentions: 
…there is one point I would like to stress that I do not believe is nearly as 
widely recognized - a point that does indeed mark an important difference 
between his [Kant’s] philosophical approach and that of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. It concerns Kant’s method of 
argumentation and his justification for the claim that space, time, and the 
categories are of subjective origin. Kant follows the standard practice of 
modern philosophy, whether rationalistic or empiricist, in starting with our 
ideas of things and inquiring into their origin and justification and by 
assuming that this means that one must be able to show that they are not 
only subjective, but objectively valid. … In each case - whether with regard 
to space and time or with regard to the categories - Kant’s strategy for 
demonstrating their objective validity is the same. He shows that each of 
them is a necessary (and hence invariant) feature of any object of experience 
 because the experience of such an object without them is inconceivable 
(Nenon 2008, 431). 
The author of this article believes that in Husserl’s transcendental philosophy is the 
same intuition as in the Kant’s transcendental philosophy, which demonstrates a 
different form of the argumentation. Husserl searches the foundations of the 
knowledge, and Kant do it too, while the answer to this question can be original. 
Because of that, the author supposes that not Husserl, but his explicit and implicit 
followers make the necessity of the scientific split (to be the product of radical 
subjectivity) in a view of the different forms of the disunity and the kind of the 
relativism. As Sankey (2012) demonstrates, 
…it might be objected that, with the exception of Barnes and Bloor, and 
possibly Feyerabend, the authors considered in this paper do not regard 
themselves as relativists. But self-identification as a relativist is not always 
a good guide to relativism. What is important is the implication of a 
philosopher’s position, not whether the philosopher characterizes 
themselves or their position as relativist. The views of some philosophers 
have relativistic consequences, even though they deny the charge of 
relativism (Sankey 2012, 569). 
II. In contemporary philosophy of physics, the relativistic consequences quite fully 
approve, even if its representatives disagree with other Husserl’s views, or even if 
they do not know these views in detail. As in Seidel (2011) is shown, 
…the question I tried to answer in this paper was: what does Fleck mean 
when he is claiming that he is not a relativist? And my answer to this 
question that I argued for by looking at Flecks texts was: he means nearly 
the same as Mannheim in claiming that he is a relationist. An implicit 
consequence of this answer is a critique of attempts to see a tout court 
difference between a Mannheimian and a Fleckian answer to the absolutist: 
there are crucial differences between both authors, but the differences are 
 minor with respect to the question of relativism (Seidel 2011, 236). 
It is not hard to see that nowadays philosophy of physics supposes the collective interpretation 
of the scientific subjectivity, but it is exactly the subjectivity that must have a special kind of 
intuitive environing world (Breuer and Roth 2015). The problem of time in this context has a 
significance ‘search of the basics of human reality’. The author believes such significance of 
time problem helps to find an image of unity in contemporary epistemology. 
Symbolization of the Universal Clock and Disunity of Foundations in 
Contemporary Philosophy of Physics 
This section presents the pro-arguments with respect to the following Thesis: 
T.5 The symbolization of the Universal Clock discloses the essence of the relationship between 
philosophical speculations and the studies in the natural science. 
The proof reasons with respect to the Thesis (5) are as follows 
I. In this article, the argument concerning the proposition ‘result of analysis of relations 
between scientific knowledge and the nature of time visualizes the foundations of 
contemporary philosophy of physics’ presupposes that problem of time, which the 
author formulates in sect. 1 in a view of the finding the Universal Clock, discloses 
the essence of the relationship between philosophical speculations and the studies 
in the natural science. The investigations of time in the natural philosophy since Antiquity 
(Aristotle 350BC/2008) until building of the last great philosophical systems at the 19
th 
century (Hegel 1817/1970) demonstrates three main characteristics of time. The nature of 
time has paradoxical character, wherefore the nature of time consists in the unity of its 
existence and non-existence. Time can be used as the measurement of the duration, but time 
itself has no any scale for the measure except parts of time itself. In the Greek Classics, time 
identifies with the imaginary movement. In the German classical thought, time has a view 
of an ideal process of the nature formation. In general, time has the calculability 
signification, representing the universal regulations of the language practice and as a part of 
intelligent forming of natural processes. 
II. The problem of time provides a question about conditions of identity for the natural 
world and human reality or an identity for the objectivity and subjectivity as per basis 
 of the scientific knowledge. Contemporary philosophers conclude that it is rather 
difficult to reach the rational solution of the concrete basis of the science, whether or 
not it is a phenomenology of consciousness or in the meaning of traditional 
contradiction between consciousness and reality. A solution of the task can be 
executed pragmatically onto the basis of the random metaphysical postulate. Jean-
Paul Sartre (1943/1993) notes that time as a phenomenon only in the possibility 
belongs to the nature same as 
…in physics of Einstein it has been found the advantageous to speak of 
event conceived as having spatial dimensions and a temporal dimension and 
as determine its place in the space-time; or, on the other hand will it remain 
preferable despite all to preserve the ancient duality “consciousness-being” 
(Sartre 1943/1993, 625). 
This conclusion assumes that non-classical approach is lawful, and classical 
approach is lawful too. A framework of the traditional views includes 
contradiction between consciousness and reality, or being, and contrasting of 
space and time is significance of a form of dot and number, the locations of an 
object but also the measure of such formation. Non-classical approach includes 
representation that world around, its attributes are only the epiphenomenon of 
human consciousness, and these ideas demonstrate interesting parallels with 
Theory of Relativity by Einstein, which is based on the concept of space-time 
four-dimension manifold by Minkowski (1909). 
Michel Janssen (2009) disputes with Harvey Brown (2005) about interpretation of 
the meaning of space-time in Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. Both authors agree 
that space-time is not a substance. Brown (2005) mentions that space-time is the 
description of rods and clocks. Janssen (2009) supposes that Minkowski space-time 
in the relativistic theory is the codification of the rules of the investigation, which 
helps to build a world picture on the base of Lorentz invariant of all dynamical laws 
in the limits of the kinematical constraint.  This methodological dispute has some 
 epistemological consequences leading to a question of the universal foundations of 
the understanding of time and space. In contemporary philosophy of physics, the 
universal foundations provide a completeness of the propositional attitudes. The 
contrasting of the classical and non-classical approaches helps to solve the problem. 
It is needing the way for coordination of these approaches. As Kulikov (2015) has 
shown, in contemporary philosophy of science, two basic ideas lead to the allocation 
of the universal foundations. A cultural-historical process can be presented in the 
discrete kind of a view. The limits of the consciousness of philosophical and 
scientific knowledge, namely the structures of collective imagination have a virtual 
nature as the interaction of the conscious elements of the limitation, found in real 
history like the contradictory relation to the past or to the possible future. Such 
propositions can be interpreted by the means of the notions in the scope of the natural 
science. Time therefore is an equivalent for a ratio of action or an energy of a cultural 
phenomenon to the historical meaning or its weight and to the place of such 
phenomenon, meaning the distance in the space of contradictory interactions. For 
instance, debates of Einstein and Bohr have a small distance of their happening until 
present days, but they show the big influence, or the cultural weight and high level 
of energy as a discussion potential. It is understandable the reasons of shortness of 
the time from unknown status until global popularity. 
III. In the history of culture, a case of the transforming of the Christianity into the World 
religion at the Late Antiquity illustrates the relations concerning time, space and 
energy. Since the beginning, the Christianity is one of the sects within Judaism. This 
sect competes with the other religious communities with the participants of the 
Paganism and Mithraism (Fox 2006). The historians show that, in Ancient Rome, the 
paganism includes a complex of the traditional beliefs that creates the original 
intellectual traditions, for instance, the Stoicism and Neo-Platonism. The 
representatives of the ancient scholarship are the high-educated persons who made 
the sophisticated systems of the thought. The representatives of the Early Christianity 
 are primarily the low-educated slaves and soldiers with an inclusion of a little part of 
the Ancient Rome aristocracy. By the end of 3
rd  
century the situation changed and 
Christianity includes the most part of the Ancient Rome society where the plebs and 
aristocracy involve. An ancient scholarship can not help their owners to choose the 
counterarguments against a power of the Christian practices for the metaphysical 
point of a view. The members of the Ancient Rome have preferred just to believe in 
the Resurrection and in the God’s Heavenly Court at the End of Times than choose 
an idea of the entrance of the person activity into the processes of the evolutions of 
the World Soul. The personal way to a salvation, offered by Christianity, has become 
more attractive than the sophisticated arguments of the ancient scholars’ in a favor 
of the Pagan beliefs. In addition, the representatives of the Christian theology ought 
to fight against inner-Christian schisms, namely Gnosticism, Aryanism and many 
others schism. The simplicity and effectiveness of the canonic arguments have 
helped to consolidate the community because of the intuitive comprehension of the 
faith. The discussion potential of the canonic Christianity has provided a rate of its 
progression in the Ancient Rome. The Christianity has disclosed its cultural weight. 
As a result, the period of development of the Christianity as the World religion was 
a very short. 
IV. In general, each cultural phenomenon with long period of popularity is characterized 
by small weight or small distance of making, but surely has very strong energy. A 
similar reason explains why some popular phenomena in past can be unknown 
concerning present-day relation. They have a very small energy from the beginning. 
Philosophy of physics shows foundations for the connection of natural science with 
humanities. It is resolved the problem whether time is natural process, or it is only 
the human-made phenomenon, and contemporary kind of essential disunity is partly 
eliminated. 
Conclusion 
The symbolic signification of time concept demonstrates the prerequisites for organization of 
 natural knowledge and humanities as well. The propositional attitude, which defines the 
meaning of time, discloses the essence of the problem of time in two aspects of discussion on 
disunity of foundations in contemporary philosophy of physics. On the one hand, the formation 
of human nature in modernistic and contemporary thought opens a special role of the philosophy 
of physics in the theoretical philosophy. This role concerns a disclosure of the cultural and 
historical development of the physics, which is defined by the structures of the collective 
imagination as the aprioristic limits for the comprehension, namely, the attitudes ‘Cosmos– 
Human’ at Antiquity, or ‘God–Human’ at Medieval period. The aprioristic limit of the 
comprehension at the Modern period is an attitude ‘Nature–Human’. On the other hand, research 
reveals the prospect to the knowledge of the natural and cultural processes based on unification 
of the independent complexes of the natural science and humanities, their active interaction and 
mutual enrichment within propositional attitudes of contemporary philosophy of physics. The 
scientific collaborations play this role regarding presentation of a ratio of action or an energy to 
a historical meaning or a weight of each phenomenon and to its place, signifying a distance in a 
space of the contradictory interactions regarding the future and the past. 
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